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WOMENS’ EXPERIENCE IN LEGAL
EDUCATION: SILENCING AND
ALIENATION
LUCINDA FINLEY*

In these remarks, which I will confine to the personal and
anecdotal level, I wish to examine what women students say is their
experience of silencing in legal education. The remarks describe
how this comes about and why the experience of being silenced is
so troubling, not for just women but also for the law. I will also
address how I, as a feminist law teacher, teach my classes — not
just my classes in feminist theory but also those in labour law, torts
or whatever else my Dean might persuade me to teach at some
time.
My interest in gender and legal education grew out of the
experience of having numerous women students at Yale law school
approach me to confide how they felt silenced by and alienated
from their legal education. This was painful on two levels. First, I
was hearing their profound expressions of pain, and, as a teacher, I
was distressed that they were learning to dislike the law and fight
the law, instead of becoming attracted to it. But it was also painful
because it reminded me that I, too, had felt that my views were not
always heard nor appreciated when I was a law student. I continue
to feel this every day, as one of the token women on a law school
faculty — and one foolish enough to identify myself publicly as a
feminist, thus facing the risks of marginalization to which
Catharine MacKinnon has referred. Women students tell me that
their classroom comments get swallowed up by what seems to them
like a “black hole”; they are completely ignored. These reactions
make them feel that they must have said something very stupid —
until, five minutes later, a male makes the same comment and

suddenly the professor’s reaction is, “what a brilliant remark,” and
the point becomes the focus of discussion for the next ten minutes.
I knew exactly what they were talking about because this had
happened to me as a student; it still happens to me when I try to
speak at a faculty meeting or workshop.
But there is another aspect of the women students’ silence
which raises questions about the nature of law and demonstrates
how fundamental is the feminist challenge to law and legal
education. This aspect is also raised by comments women students
make to me. They feel resistant to, and often profoundly angered by
or alienated from, what they are learning, because gender is always
being ignored. Women notice when the gender implications of a
legal issue or doctrine are being ignored. Sometimes this noticing,
especially with confused, frightened or intimidated first year law
students, takes the form of a woman feeling, based on her life
experience, that there is a gender issue here. She wonders if she
should mention it, thinking perhaps she is wrong because the
professor who is supposed to know so much has not mentioned it.
Occasionally, one of these women students finally becomes bold
enough or angry enough to raise her hand, and her comment is met
with the professor saying something like, “well, could you rephrase
that like a lawyer please”, or “next”, or “I fail to see the relevance
of that.” This sort of professorial reaction — dismissing the
student’s point of view — reinforces men students’ pervasive
blindness to gender, or reinforces their sense that gender issues are
trivial and unimportant. For the women, it reinforces the vague
doubts they had that their life experiences or their perspectives are
not integral to the law after all.
Let me give some concrete examples of this kind of reaction by
women to gender issues being ignored, and the silencing and
alienation that can result. I have had many women students come to
me (so many that I can no longer count the number on both hands)
and say something like, “I turned off from law school when Roe v
Wade,1 about the constitutionality of state regulation of abortion,
was being discussed in class as if it were solely a matter of the
appropriate boundaries between the authority of courts and
legislatures.” These frustrated women students would be sitting
there, often for two or three days, while the case was being
discussed in this abstract doctrinal fashion. It seemed to them that
the professor did not even dare mention abortion, much less that

abortion is something that is important to women’s status in society
because they are subject to societal control over their bodies and
reproduction.
The constitutional law professor would discuss this loaded issue
of abortion or the criminal law professor would discuss rape or
battering as if it had never occurred to him that in this group of
students there were some who may have experienced abortion, or
rape; or that some of them, even if they have not yet experienced it,
know that they may have to face it at some point in their life. For
no woman can abortion be simply a matter of the appropriate
division of authority between courts and legislatures. When women
students sit in such a law class and hear it treated as if that is the
only issue, it produces one of two reactions. For some it produces a
reaction bordering on rage and fury, either at the professor or the
law, that the law — or the professor — could completely ignore
women and act as if issues of governmental structure were more
important. For others it creates a sense of frustration and
puzzlement — a sense that maybe there is something wrong with
them, because they think this issue is there but the professor acts as
if it does not arise. Often, either of these two reactions causes
women to turn from the law. And, the failure to discuss the gender
implications means the men students never have to grapple with the
fact that abortion is a gender issue, and not just a matter of the
appropriate division of authority between courts and legislatures.
There are many other examples of women noticing gender
issues and the professor not, some in much less loaded contexts.
For example, some students told me about their frustration with the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Gilmore v Utah,2 in
which the Court held that the mother of convicted murderer Gary
Gilmore had no standing to intervene in the sentencing hearing,
because she was an uninterested, unaffected outsider. Another
student once came to me and said, “I was in contracts class today
and we were reading a case from 1860 where the woman had done
something but the husband was the party suing. 1 felt like it was a
stupid question to ask, but since the woman was really the party
involved, why was the husband suing? I was afraid that if I asked
this question the professor would have told me it was a stupid
question.” So she came to me to ask the question. I gave her an
explanation of the old laws that meant that, once women were
married, they became in the eyes of the law non-persons and were

disabled from suing on their own behalf. A light bulb went on for
the student. She said, “that changes the old case; that is really
central to the case. How could the professor not have mentioned
that?” I gave her a pep talk and encouraged her to raise her hand in
class the next day to share this enlightenment with the rest of the
class. And, of course, much as she had feared, the professor’s
comment was, “I utterly fail to see the relevance of that. Contract
law is contract law. The gender of the parties, who can make the
contract and who can sue on the contract are completely irrelevant
to the formulation of the doctrinal rules of contract.” Not only was
this erroneous historically, but, as I subsequently learned, it was a
long time before that student ever felt comfortable speaking in class
again. From that day on she decided that she disliked and distrusted
the law of contract. The class lost the important perspective of her
voice, and she lost some respect for the law and had to spend a lot
of the rest of her first year in law school struggling with the law
instead of learning.
These incidents suggest that sometimes the kinds of comments
that women might want to offer, because they think the comments
should be profoundly relevant to the law, may be silenced in legal
education. Professors think they are legally irrelevant and
additionally they tread into the scary, forbidden realm of emotion.
Consider the woman who has had an abortion who becomes angry
when abortion is discussed in class as about something other than
women’s lives, and who finally becomes angry enough to say,
“wait a minute!” Often what happens is that once women decide to
speak, the comments do sound like emotional outbursts. But one of
the central insights of feminist theory is to challenge directly the
reason/emotion dichotomy by asking why it is that whatever
ignores gender is considered “neutral reason”, and why it is that
insisting gender not be ignored, is so often labelled as “emotion” —
and thus irrelevant to law? I think my answer to that question is
quite obvious — our understandings of the categories “reason” and
“emotion”, and “legal relevance” are affected by the fact that for
centuries men have shaped and defined what counts as theory, as
reason and as law.
I will now elaborate what I try to do when I teach to overcome
the pervasive treatment of gender as irrelevant and to respond to
women’s complaints of silencing and alienation. I think what
distinguishes my teaching, perhaps first and foremost, from that of

many of my colleagues is that gender and power are never ignored
regardless of the subject. I discuss how a legal doctrine may be
based more on the experiences of one gender group rather than the
other — the reasonable man standard in torts, for example. I also
discuss how a legal doctrine may have different impacts on, and
consequences for, people of different genders — such as the
linkage between tort damages and lost wages. I wish to add a
caveat to comments earlier this morning that we teachers make our
perspectives known from the outset in the classroom, and pick up
on Catharine’s reference to the risks for women in doing this. I
must say that the one time I decided I would be open with the
students and announce publicly at the beginning of semester that I
was a feminist and would develop a feminist perspective on torts,
was the one time I had a rather rebellious group of male students in
the class who kept groaning that they did not see what women’s
lives had to do with them at all. Fortunately, the women students
were emboldened enough by me to answer those objections for me
so that I never had to say anything. I have found that if you wish to
discuss gender issues in mainstream doctrinal courses, it is better
simply to do so, treating them as they are — an important part of
real tort law.
Neither do I ignore the experience of peoples’ lives. I treat
experience as fundamentally relevant to the law and often use that
experience to test, critique and challenge the law. Consider labour
law, for example. My class in employment law begins by
discussing our experiences with employment. Chances are, if there
are women in the class, and there always are, we quickly move,
from their experiences at work, into discussing gender dynamics of
the work place, including gendered notions of work and the value
of work. That raises important questions about what labour law
regulates and what aspects of human work it leaves invisible. Once
students’ experiences of work are raised, a wonderful basis is
offered against which to test and critique the legal doctrine which
sees work primarily as a contractual exchange. The use of their
own experiences engages the students in the law in a way that
offering various theories and doctrinal approaches does not. But it
also signals to the students, black, white, Hispanic and female, that
the experience of each of them and every one else is profoundly
relevant. It also provides a wonderful occasion for asking why
some peoples’ experiences are much more reflected in the law than

others. The students’ experiences are used as the lens for examining
the ways in which certain aspects of human experience, often the
male ones — such as work being separate from family demands —
are much more embraced by and reflected in the law. In tort law,
for example, that enables me to raise questions such as, who is this
fictional reasonable person? What is his gender? Why are things
that seem so ordinary and commonplace to women so often
branded as the reactions of unreasonable people in tort law? I use
women’s experiences — the labelling of what they do from nine to
five being labelled work, and what they do from five p.m. to nine
o’clock the next morning not work — both as a way of critiquing
the measure of damages in tort law, which privileges work activity
over other kinds of fundamental human activity, and also as a way
of critiquing the law of employment as being fundamentally
gendered in its definition of work.
So, I teach law as Catharine MacKinnon has mentioned, as a
fundamentally gendered subject, as something that has been
defined by and shaped by men. I examine the consequences of this
for the people — white, black, Hispanic and female — who
historically in the United States were excluded from participating in
shaping it. This latter remark should suggest to you that feminism
is not just about women. I think it is about using the experiences of
women to help us see the various forms of oppression. It is useful
for seeing new possibilities for, or needs for, changing the law to
make it less oppressive and more a positive tool for overcoming the
many forms of oppression and disempowerment that exist.
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